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ABSTRACT 
Transformers are key assets in a pow-
er plant. This article explores the use 
of mapping transformer populations 
to quantify the operational and eco-
nomic costs due to various risk fac-
tors, including design, external, and 
accelerated aging risks. Generation, 
start-up, and auxiliary transformers 
are typically designed for specific 
functions within an operating block 
in a power plant. The planning, man-
ufacturing, and installation of cus-
tom-designed power transformers 
can take many years to complete. 
Once in operation, the premature 
failure of these critical assets before 
their expected End of Life (EOL) can 
be devastating to the electric utility or 
industrial company owner. The map-
ping process aids in the proactive 
identification of those transformers 
that may create the most economical 
and performance risk. The process 
helps to identify remediation, conser-
vation, and conditioning actions that 
ensure that these critical assets func-
tion throughout their planned lifetime.
KEYWORDS
mapping, risks, critical assets, trans-
former aging, accelerated aging, risk 
assessment, economic cost, maximiz-
ing critical assets, preventative main-
tenance
Mapping as a risk 
and cost assessment 
methodology
Proactive transformer mapping assists in operational and 
financial decision-making
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1. Introduction
Our January 2020 article [1] focused on 
the use of the mapping process as a start-
ing point to determine the appropriate 
remediation and conservation measures 
that your maintenance team needs to 
take to ensure a transformer block sub-
jected to accelerated aging performs 
over the long-term. This article expands 
on mapping and risk assessment to 
identify the actions required to extend 
the operating lifetimes of transformers 
subjected to other forms of risk, such 
as design and random external risks. In 
cases of these risks, the mapping pro-
cess generates different remediation and 
conservation strategies to ameliorate 
and control them. These strategies are 
then compared so that the option that 
best balances risks can be implemented 
with an evaluation of operational and 
financial considerations. We use a hypo-
thetical example, based on typical field 
experience, to illustrate these concepts.
2. Types of risk
A transformer block is a complex system. 
The transformers and auxiliary equip-
ment that comprise an operating block 
are interconnected and must function 
as designed for the block to meet oper-
ational objectives over an extended peri-
od. The issues of accelerated aging and its 
effect on premature failure have already 
been addressed in previous articles. A 
transformer block can also be at risk due 
to poor design and / or workmanship 
that create functional weaknesses in a 
transformer. These, in turn, can cascade 
throughout the system to cause outages, 
fires, or other system performance is-
sues in the transformer block. Defects, 
such as poor welded joints or a defec-
tive head gasket sealing, can increase 
the risk of failure of an individual piece 
of equipment or the entire transformer 
block. Random factors, such as lightning 
strikes, natural disasters, or short-circuit-
ing, create another form of risk that is 
difficult to predict. 
The term end of life (EOL) is common-
ly used to describe the time at which a 
transformer becomes inoperable. This 
term is imprecise as it does not convey 
the actions that can be taken to reduce 
the risks that most affect a transformer 
block. These actions could include oil re-
conditioning and monitoring in the case 
of accelerated aging or creating redun-
dancy in the system to protect from the 
abrupt failure of critical assets. A useful 
term used in this article is the remain-
ing substance (RS), which conveys the 
concept of a valuable asset that can be 
consumed or conserved, depending on 
how the risks are managed. RS was intro-
duced by DTC (Daemisch Transformer 
Consult company) as a more actionable 
term instead of relative terms like life-
time or lifespan. It is based on the com-
plete picture taken from the condition 
assessment resulting from DGA, Furan 
analysis, oil condition monitoring, and 
all other available information. It, there-
fore, is not a simple "index," rather a con-
cise analysis based on the interaction of 
indicators, experience, and expertise. 
The decline in RS is exponential if the 
appropriate measures are not proactively 
taken. It is important to institute the re-
medial and / or conservation measures 
early enough so RS can be preserved in 
good operating condition throughout 
the required operating lifetime of the 
transformer. Field experience suggests 
that once RS reaches 60 %, the remain-
ing operating life of the transformer 
is only six years. By taking proper and 
timely action to manage risk factors, the 
transformer's lifetime can be extended 
by another 10 to 15 years. The chart in 
Fig.1, created by the author, depicts the 
trajectories of RS with and without con-
servation measures.
2.1. Type 1failures
Type 1 failures refer to age-related degra-
dation of electro-mechanical assem-
blies such as bushings, OLTCs, and solid 
insulation that can contribute to trans-
former block failure. The risks caused 
by accelerated aging are quantified in 
the mapping process through DGA and 
transformer fluid testing. These testing 
procedures provide indications of the 
level of depolymerization of the solid 
insulation in the transformer as it can-
not be measured directly. The level and 
rate of exposure of cellulose to aging 
accelerators such as high temperature, 
moisture, oxygen (O2), and acids are the 
starting points to this process. These in-
fluence the physical and electrical prop-
erties of the transformer and influence 
the rate of accelerated aging. 
Type 1 risks are accurately determined 
with today's increased sophistication of 
test methodologies and technologies. 
Mapping is a robust, proactive process that pro-
vides an overall picture of potential risks and 
worst-case scenarios, including financial risks 
and cost comparisons
By taking proper and timely action to manage 
risk factors, the transformer's lifetime can 
be extended by another 10 to 15 years
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formance. Proper vetting can take years 
before the probability of failure reaches 
normal levels.
2.3. Type 3 failures
Type 3 failures are external influences, 
such as lightning or short-circuits, which 
can generate sudden and catastroph-
ic transformer failures. The risk from a 
lightning strike is unquantifiable due to 
the uncertainty of the timing and sever-
ity of the strike. However, the short cir-
cuit of a third-party grid or station trans-
former also can create this type of risk. 
Type 3 risk is uncontrollable and ran-
dom. Type 3 risks are incorporated into 
the mapping process by focusing on the 
transformers, which are most exposed to 
this uncertainty. 
The uncertainty surrounding Type 3 
failures makes them difficult to predict. 
As such, the cost in the event of a Type 
3 failure is often used as a proxy for the 
risk. These measures include lost rev-
enue from a loss of power production 
over some period or the cost of buying 
power on the open market. Type 3 risk 
does not increase or decrease over time 
and can be thought of as a uniform 
probability distribution over the lifetime 
overheating, which in turn contributes 
to accelerated aging and a higher prob-
ability of premature failure. Poor work-
manship on welding joints results in 
gateways for oil leakage or the ingress of 
moisture and atmospheric gases into the 
transformer, which again causes acceler-
ated aging leading to premature failure. 
Type 2 risks can develop when the poor 
design or poor-quality workmanship of 
a new transformer causes the prema-
ture failure of the transformer, resulting 
in significant lost revenue and repair / 
replacement costs. Understanding how 
the new equipment reacts to actual field 
conditions when connected to existing 
equipment in the block takes time. 
The probability of Type 2 failures begins 
at a high level, but with time, it declines 
as the transformer is checked, and ad-
justments are made to optimize its per-
Once the effects of the accelerators are 
quantified, measures to conserve the 
cellulose insulation can be undertaken 
to extend the lifetime of the transformer. 
These measures include gas monitoring 
and oil regeneration. If managed proper-
ly, Type 1 risks can be controlled to slow 
age-related degradation and EOL of a 
transformer. It is important to under-
stand that even when the proper actions 
are taken, the transformer will continue 
to age but at a slower rate than otherwise. 
This means that the probability of failure 
from type 1 risks increases with time.
2.2. Type 2 failures
Type 2 failures are associated with inad-
equate design or poor construction of a 
transformer, which often causes sudden 
EOL conditions. The inadequate design 
of a transformer's cooling system creates 
All transformers are exposed to various 
risks; as they age, their poor design can 
create functional weaknesses, which can 
be detected during the operation of the 
transformer
Figure 1.The nature of accelerated aging of power transformers with and without conservation measures
92    TRANSFORMERS  MAGAZINE  |  Volume 7, Issue 2  |  2020
RISK
preservation plan, the second phase of 
conditioning and conservation actions 
to one of the generation step-up units 
(GSU) began when a transportable 
conditioning unit was installed. In the 
third year of the conservation process, a 
second transportable conditioning unit 
was installed to further augment the 
conditioning of a second GSU trans-
former. 
The data being collected from on-
line gas monitoring systems over the 
first three years of the lifetime exten-
sion program, provided a significant 
amount of baseline information on the 
trend of RS. The analysis of this data 
raised the possibility of a longer lifetime 
extension. Because of this, it was decid-
ed to augment the assessment of criti-
cal assets in the plant. The scope was 
changed to include the evaluation of 
three scenarios where the cost and risks 
of a longer operating period would be 
evaluated. The three scenarios would 
allow the plant owner to compare the 
different alternatives so that he could 
determine whether a further ten-year 
extension was feasible and, if so, which 
course of action would be optimal. The 
motivation for this broader scope was 
to determine if the plant could continue 
to generate power and heat production 
revenues at a reasonable cost without 
incurring significant operating risks.
The mapping steps to accomplish this 
broader assessment of the CHP are as 
follows:
5.1. Mapping step 1: Statement of 
objectives
Identify the life extension options avail-
able to the CHP transformer block to 
ensure safe and reliable operation until 
a scheduled extended plant shutdown 
in 12 years. Provide the asset owner a 
complete risk/reward assessment of the 
proposed options.
of the block. Type 3 failures are especial-
ly dangerous when they affect weakened 
assets, which cause a cascade of outages 
to other units in the block.
3. Reasons for mapping
All transformers are exposed to various 
risks. They age over time, causing pre-
mature failure. Their poor design can 
create functional weaknesses, which are 
only detected when operating over time. 
Random weather or grid-related risks 
can cause a complete transformer block 
shutdown. The mapping process de-
scribed in this article is used to identify 
the risk to which a transformer block is 
exposed and what actions are needed to 
counteract the negative impact they have 
on performance. The process also con-
siders the objectives of the plant owner, 
which may include the timing of plant 
shutdown or operating extensions, fi-
nancial or safety goals. If not maintained 
properly, the original financial justifica-
tion of the transformer and function-
al block in which it operates may not 
be reached. The final outcome of the 
mapping process is to provide multiple 
options that the plant owner can select 
based on an acceptable level of risk and 
required economic commitment.
4. The mapping process
The mapping process consists of eight 
steps. Each step builds on the next, re-
sulting in the evaluation of different 
long-term replacement, remediation, 
and conservation actions that can be 
taken to reduce the risks of EOL. These 
action plans identify their associated 
costs and risks to enable the transformer 
block operator to select the actions best 
suited to meet the objectives of the plant. 
The steps in the mapping process will be 
described using the following scenario: 
5. Scenario description - A 
case study
In order to ensure that the transform-
ers in a combined heat and power plant 
(CHP) would operate until its planned 
shutdown in six years, a preservation 
plan was developed for the plant. The 
initial phase of this plan was to regen-
erate insulating fluid for high-voltage, 
start-up, and station supply trans-
formers. One year after the start of the 
5.2. Mapping step 2: Data collection 
and documentation
A complete history of the following data 
should be available and must include:
a. Dissolved Gas Analysis (DGA) - The 
collection of historical data on the types 
and changing levels of certain gases is a 
critical phase of the mapping process. 
b. Oil condition measures, including 
oil acidity, interfacial tension (IFT), 
breakdown voltage (BDV), furan 
content, and inhibitor content. 
c. Data regarding maintenance and fail-
ures must also be collected.
A key objective of this stage of the map-
ping process is to begin to understand 
the interactions of the aging accelerators 
and their influence on the aging process, 
as indicated in Fig 2.
5.3. Mapping step 3: Data analysis
1. The DGA analysis at this stage pro-
vides the data from which trans-
former condition diagnostics and 
risks are identified. 
2. Measuring oil's aging impact on pow-
er transformers indicates the acceler-
ation of the aging rate and the actions 
needed for its amelioration.
3. Maintenance history and data can 
show when and how mechanical 
anomalies occurred and record the 
mechanical design of replaced parts 
such as cooling systems and on load 
tap changer (OLTC)
Table 1 shows the number and function 
of the ten transformers in the CHP and 
their EOL assessment. The EOL assess-
ment is also a complex procedure that 
includes the analysis of important indi-
cators of O2 consumption, the level and 
The mapping process consists of eight 
steps; each step builds on the next, resulting 
in the evaluation of different long-term 
replacement, remediation, and conservation 
actions that can be taken to reduce the 
risks of EOL
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types of furans, and the rate of decline of 
oil quality.
The data gathered in Step 2 is used to de-
velop an understanding of the potential 
areas of risk and the possible replace-
ment, remediation, and conservation 
strategies needed to extend the life of 
this CHP transformer block by another 
ten years.
Each transformer's aging condition was 
assessed based on a number of factors 
derived from continuous gas monitor-
ing and indicator trends. Data collect-
ed from the transformer provide clues 
to its operating (service) condition. If 
high rates of gassing are found, for ex-
ample, they may suggest hotspots due 
to poor cooling, which then leads to 
accelerated aging. High oxygen con-
sumption may also indicate high rates 
of cellulose degradation due to high oil 
acidity. The expert assessment of these 
clues pinpoints the true service condi-
tion of the transformer. The appropriate 
remedial and conservation measures 
based on the transformer's actual ser-
vice condition can then be implement-
ed. The remaining lifespan estimates for 
each transformer were made, and each 
trans former was assigned to a remain-
ing lifespan category, as shown above. 
Other factors such as load capacity, RS, 
and the possibility of advanced break-
down (PoAB) due to Type 2-3 risks 
were evaluated too. PoAB factors are ex-
plained in the previous article [1].
5.4. Mapping step 4: Risk 
assessment
• Transformer GSU1- This gener-
ator step-up transformer shows a 
slightly reduced substance ranking 
due to a number of factors. These in-
clude higher O2 consumption and a 
high furan re-saturation rate, which 
indicates some accelerated aging. 
Treatments such as oil regeneration, 
remove furans from the insulating oil. 
In old, highly degraded transformers, 
furans trapped in the transformer's 
windings are not removed during 
such treatment. These furans reenter 
(re-saturate) the furan-free oil after 
regeneration. The rate of re-satura-
tion can be quite high, where in one 
or two years, the furan content could 
be as high as it was before oil treat-
ment. Some indications of high heat 
in some zones suggest the overload-
ing of this transformer. Two different 
"high heat zones" can be found in a 
transformer. The temperature ranges 
in which they are found are different. 
A hotspot is a localized high heat zone 
with temperatures in the range of 
300 – 600 °C. Temperature spikes to 
over 1000 °C can also occur. Hotspots 
are created by dirty or faulty electri-
cal connections such as poor solder 
joints. They result in excessive gassing 
and high accelerated aging rates of the 
transformer. A hot zone has tempera-
tures in the 150 to 300 °C range.  These 
hot zones do not produce excessive 
gassing but do contribute to cellulose 
degradation. Hot zones are created 
The purpose of transformer mapping is 
to estimate the remaining lifetime, the 
potential for lifetime extension, and to 
assess investments as well as long-term 
preservation plans
Figure 2. The cellulose decomposition process and its by-products in power transformers
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Table 1. Ten transformers in the CHP
by poor oil circulation resulting in 
insufficient cooling. Oil acidity was 
good. It was determined that GSU1 
would need to operate with simulta-
neous gas conditioning to slow the O2 
aging process. Estimated remaining 
lifetime is four years.
• Transformer GSU2- This genera-
tor step-up unit is in slightly better 
condition than GSU1. While RS is 
in the same range, a leak in a diverter 
switch shows acetylene in the system 
accompanied by a partial discharge. 
As is recommended for GSU1, GSU2 
should be operated with the shared 
simultaneous gas conditioning unit. 
The estimated remaining lifetime 
is greater than five years.
• Transformer GSUOLD1- This 
generator step-up (GSU) trans-
former is in a precarious condition. 
All EOL factors were so low, indi-
cating RS was non-existent. It can 
be used as a backup only under con-
trolled conditions. Estimated re-
maining lifetime is less than two 
years.
• Transformer GSUSPARE1- This 
transformer was acquired from a 
peak-load gas-fired power station 
years ago. It is in excellent condition, 
despite being 15 years old. It was only 
in operation for approximately two 
years. Available data are not reliable 
as gas samples were taken while the 
transformer was not operating. In-
spection of its bushings shows some 
capacitance deviations, which creates 
a fire risk. If re-testing confirms that 
the capacitive deviations remain and 
TANδ testing shows voltage leakage, 
it is recommended that the bushings 
be replaced. Estimated remaining 
lifetime is over ten years.
• Auxiliary Transformers AUX1-
AUXB11- AUX 1 and 2 show some 
problems caused by defective tap se-
lectors and leaky diverter switches, 
which cause high C2H2 levels. AUX3, 
AUX4, AUX5, and AUXB11 showed 
inconsistent readings of decreased 
moisture with higher BDV. This could 
be due to a lack of data reported on 
these units. Estimated remaining 
lifetimes for AUX1, AUX2, and 
AUX3 are approximately five years. 
Estimated remaining lifetimes for 
the remaining auxiliaries are over 
five years.
5.5. Mapping step 5:  
Classification of the units based on 
priority-of-importance criteria
The key transformers in the CHP are 
the GSUs: GSU1 and GSU2. The redun-
dant older GSUOLD1 has the greatest 
probability of not reaching the extended 
10-year operating limit. Permanent de-
ployment of the existing conditioning 
units will reduce the Type 1 risk of pre-
mature failure of GSUOLD1 if needed for 
backup, but the risk cannot be eliminated 
completely. The redundancy and excel-
lent functionality of GSUSPARE1 also re-
duce operational risk for the GSU cohort 
of transformers. The acquisition of new 
GSUs would almost guarantee to reach 
the 10-year extension but may introduce 
Type 2 risks, including financial risks in 
resale or deployment at the closing of the 
CHP.
The auxiliary transformers are a riski-
er cohort but have less impact on the 
operation of the CHP. The redundancy 
in this cohort is sufficient to minimize 
most risks to the entire plant. The con-
nection of AUX1 to an external power 
source will further reduce the risk of 
losing revenue because of a decrease in 
the generating capacity of the plant due 
to premature failure.
5.6. Mapping step 6: Preventative 
and conservation measures
The scenarios defined below are intend-
ed to reveal the different risks that may 
arise when replacement, remediation, 
and conservation measures are taken.
If, for example, high rates of gassing 
are found, they may suggest hotspots 
due to poor cooling, which then leads to 
accelerated aging
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• Scenario 1 - No procurement of new 
transformers and no access to reserve 
transformers for redundancy. Possi-
bility of loss of third-party grid trans-
former near the CHP. This scenario is 
exposed to high Type 3 risk with an 
extensive or total breakdown of the 
plant due to the lack of backup of the 
GSU transformers in the event of a 
third-party grid transformer failure. In 
addition, a failure of one of the GSU's 
would reduce revenue generation 
from power production by 50 %, as il-
lustrated in scenario 1 (Table 2). Heat 
generation revenues may also be lost.
• Scenario 2 - Invest in the three con-
servation and conditioning systems 
Different investment scenarios are made 
that address and neutralize different types 
of risks associated with transformers in 
order to adjust to the client's budget
and replace old GSU1 with a new-
er reserve transformer (150 MVA/
KV 110/10). This scenario provides 
backup for the GSUs and spares for 
start-up and station supply auxiliary 
transformers. Along with the pro-
curement of more preservation and 
conditioning units for the existing 
auxiliary transformers, Type 1 risk 
from their accelerated aging can be 
reduced so that the required 10-year 
extension of an operating lifetime can 
be achieved. The switch of the older 
GSU1 to a newer reserve will reduce 
Type 1 risk. Acquire new backup aux-
iliary transformers (3 x 30 MVA 10/6 
KV) for start-up and station supply 
for redundancy. This increases Type 
2 risk, which will decline over time. 
Also, the addition of a connection 
to an external grid transformer to 
allow supply from outside the block 
will reduce Type 3 risk in the case of 
a random risk event. This scenario is 
exposed to some Type 2 and 3 risks. 
• Scenario 3 - Switch out GSU1 with 
a newly acquired GSU (150 MVA / 
KV 110 / 10). Switch out GSU2 with 
GSUSPARE1. GSU2 can be used as a 
backup. Acquire three backup auxil-
iary units (3 x 30 MVA 10 / 6 KV). 
GSU1 and GSU2 can be backup GSU 
transformers for the new GSU and 
GSUSPARE1, which become the oper-
ating GSUs for the plant. Acquire three 
preser vation and conditioning units 
to be rotated amongst the six operat-
ing auxiliary units. Replace defective 
switches and bushings. This scenario 
is exposed to similar levels of Type 2 
and 3 risks. In addition, there is some 
financial risk created in the event the 
GSU is not sold or recommissioned at 
the end of the ten-year extension. 
5.7. Mapping step 7: Scenario cost 
estimates and risk exposure
The costs and benefits for each option 
are summarized in Table 2.
5.8. Mapping step 8: Long-term 
preservation plan
Based on the economic analysis and as-
sociated risks of each of these scenarios, 
scenario 1 can be rejected outright as the 
benefits are offset by the level of risk in 
the event any one of the key assets fails. 
It is estimated that the loss of energy pro-
duction from this plant could cost up to 
€200,000 per day. With a lead time of 18 
months to receive a replacement trans-
former, this daily loss of revenue would 
continue to increase. As this is a CHP 
operation, heating revenues would also 
be lost during the winter months.
If scenario 2 is selected as the long-term 
approach to extending the life of the 
CHP, both technical and economic 
risks will be low. The backup units for 
the GSU and auxiliary transformer will 
minimize much of the risk in the event 
of a short-circuit of either a third-party 
grid transformer or an auxiliary start-
up or supply unit. The conditioning and 
monitoring units will ensure RS is con-
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served to reduce the risk of accelerated 
aging in the older units. 
If scenario 3 is selected, Type 2 risks 
will increase, making the overall risk 
profile slightly higher than scenario 
2's profile.  Scenario 3 benefits come 
at a much higher investment in new 
equipment than sce nario 2. The high-
er investment also generates a financial 
risk if there is a significant delay in sell-
ing or recommissioning the new GSUs 
after the ten-year extension period.
Summary
This article has shown how the map-
ping process can be used to quantify the 
technical, economic, and financial risk 
of transformer populations. The causes 
of transformer failure, e.g., poor design 
/ workmanship, random external phe-
nomena, and accelerated aging, deter-
mine the level of uncertainty to which a 
trans former block is exposed. Based on 
the level of uncertainty and where this 
uncertainty is the greatest, appropriate 
remediation and preservation / conserva-
tion measures can be developed to ensure 
both technical and economic objectives 
are met.  
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